Different perspectives on the role of organized interests in democratic politics imply different temporal sequences in the relationship between legislative activity and the influence activities of organized interests. Unfortunately, lack of data has greatly limited any kind of detailed examination of this temporal relationship. We address this problem by taking advantage of the chronologically very precise data on lobbying activity provided by the door pass system of the European Parliament (Berkhout and Lowery 2011) and data on EU legislative activity collected from EURLEX. After reviewing the several different theoretical perspectives on the timing of lobbying and legislative activity, we present a time-series analysis of the co-evolution of legislative output and interest groups for the period 2005-2011.
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Stopping by the European Parliament for a Chat: Organized Interests and the Timing of Legislative Activity
What is the relationship between the timing of legislative actions and the activity of organized interests? This is an important question because, despite a half century of work on the politics of interest representation, the literature offers an extraordinarily wide range of assessments of the role of organized interests in democratic politics. These views range from the traditional pluralist view (Truman 1951 ) that such interests are a vital part of democratic governance to assessments that they exert a pernicious influence by essentially purchasing public policy and, thereby, extract rents (Olson 1982) . And a few theorists even assert that organized interests are instead exploited by political officials via their manipulation of public policy agendas in what amounts to an extortion racket designed to secure campaign support (McChesney 1997) .
In a somewhat more benign organizational-based version of this argument, neocorporatist scholars tend to emphasize the relative strength of political officials in setting the agenda and the activity of interest organizations responding to political events (or, at best, occurring contemporaneously with legislative or executive activity) (Streeck and Kenworthy, 2005, 452; Wessels, 2004, 202) . Sorting through these several perspectives has constituted a very large part of our collective research agenda on organized interests. More to the immediate point, these different perspectives imply somewhat different sequences in the relationship between legislative activity of governments and the influence activities of organized interests. That is, they respectively suggest that the latter might lag, lead or be contemporaneous with the former. Thus, a close examination of their temporal relationship might provide an important lens through which to assess these wide-ranging perspectives on the role of organized interests in democratic governance.
Unfortunately, the lack of data needed to examine this temporal relationship has greatly limited any kind of detailed examination of this important question. Beyond case studies of specific, usually very controversial pieces of legislation with their inherent and inevitable selection biases, systematic data has been limited to examination of legislative activity in the national and state governments of the United States and their relationship to lobbying activity as provided via lobby registration data (Leech, Baumgartner, La Pira, and Semanko. 2005; Gray, Lowery, Fellowes, and Anderson 2005) . Lobby registration data, however, are typically reported on an annual basis, making them extremely lumpy in terms of assessing the precise timing of legislative activity and the lobbying of organized interests. As note, the annual data at best suggest that their relationship appears to be contemporaneous. But this may only be because, at the level of annual observations, more precise assessments of their timing simply cannot be observed.
We address this problem, and thereby the larger question of the role of organized interests in democratic politics, by taking advantage of the temporally precise data on the entry of organized interests into the EU interest community provided by the door pass system of the European Parliament . These data, while not without their own unique problems, have the very significant advantage that they can be sliced into very precise temporal units based on the date of registration of the lobbyist. They thus provide an almost unique opportunity to systematically assess the relationship between the timing of legislative activity and lobbying. Using this data, we are able to show that there is no evidence that the appearance of interest groups at the gates of the EU leads or lags bursts in proposals for legislation and the amount of legislation adopted. The ebbs and flows of interest group activities and legislative output over time appear to be largely unrelated when we look at 15 general policy categories, and when we examine a more detailed list of 65 precisely-defined policy sub-fields.
In the first section of the paper, we review the several different perspectives on the timing of lobbying and legislative activity along with a number of practical limitations on their interpretation. We then present the data used in our analysis. Following the analysis of that data, we return to consider the larger issue of what our findings can tell us about the role of organized interests in democratic politics and, more importantly, our theories of organized interests in the policy process.
Lagging, Leading, or a Contemporaneous Relationship
In reviewing the many different perspectives now offered on the relationship between the timing of legislative and lobbying activity, we start with the first of two null hypotheses.
This first perspective suggests that the two activities are substantively contemporaneous where, by substantive, we mean that there is no causal relationship between them. Rather, they are both responsive to something else. In this pluralist view, both lobbying activity and legislative agendas reflect less each other than real policy issues facing society. Thus, Truman (1951, 511) identified the locus of mobilization in disturbances in society. Organized interests engage in political activity to secure redress on these disturbances. But executive and legislative entrepreneurs also have powerful incentives to monitor their constituents' concerns (Wawro 2000) . Parties too win elections by finding issues on which to campaign (Macdonald and Rabinowitz 2001) . This does not mean, of course, that organized interests play an insignificant role. Indeed, pluralists assert that they are vital in sharpening political officials' understanding of the public's concerns (Truman 1951; Denzau and Munger 1986) .
But if both government officials and organized interests are responding swiftly to the same disturbances in society, then we should see the volume of lobbying activity and the content of legislative agendas changing in a contemporaneous manner with both reflecting the public's concerns. But we must also note that while this traditional pluralist expectation might be well founded for national governments, it is less clear that it applies so forcefully to the institutions of the European Union given its attenuated linkage between citizens and political officials.
A second hypothesis suggests that the content of lobbying leads legislative agendas.
There are a variety of different perspectives on the politics of interest representation that might be consistent with such a sequence. Traditional critics of interest group pluralism (Schattschneider 1960; Schlozman 1984) imply that presence in the lobbying community insures success in both defining legislative agendas and the actions taken upon their items.
Critics of the campaign finance system in the U.S. often assert that interest organizations buy legislation (Drew 1999; West 2000) . Similarly, Stigler (1971) and Peltzman's (1976) economic model of organized interests, like that of Olson (1982) , implies that organizations approach legislators with demands for protection from market competition and that they are nearly always successful. All of these models suggest that agendas change following the mobilization of organizations for political activity. Unfortunately, all are somewhat weak in empirically relating activity and agendas. Schattschneider and Schlozman do not analyze policy agendas; focusing only on lobbying presence, they simply assume that presence implies influence. Stigler and Peltzman's work are formal models with no empirical content, and much the same can be said about Olson (1982) . And despite findings that U.S. campaign contributions and lobbying are closely related (Ansolobehere, Snyder, Tripathi. 2000) , the precise causal link between campaign contributions and policy agendas remains highly contested (Wright 1996) . Even more problematic in terms of our data, it is not at all clear that organized interests have the means to purchase policy in the European Union. The critical currency in these analyses of the American cases is comprised of campaign contributions, something that organized interests obviously have little access to in Brussels.
But even models that are less critical of organized interests and less dependent on campaign finance as an instrument of influence often opt for a sequence suggesting that organizations precede agendas. Especially important here is Baumgartner and Jones' (1993) punctuated equilibrium model of the policy process. In their view, legislative agendas are quite sticky, changing only periodically as the prior policy regime becomes incapable of addressing new issues. But interest organizations play a significant role in bringing about these changes, raising new issues and new perspectives on old issues. As Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 190) note, "The mobilization of interests changes over time, and with these changes come differences in the likelihood of certain issues to hit the public agenda." Nownes' (2003) time series analysis of the mobilization of gay and lesbian organizations reaches a similar conclusion. While some initial possibility of success is necessary for the first organizations in a policy area to mobilize, growth of imitators and competitors follows swiftly, which only then leads to more frequent success in first securing space on policy agendas and then winning policy victories. Similarly, Brasher, Lowery, and Gray's (1999) time series analysis of the boom and bust cycle of mobilization in the Florida interest system found that a huge build-up of its interest community occurred over the decade of the 1980s prior to resolution of a long-standing fiscal crisis. These studies have offered important insights about long-term changes in interest systems. Still, they examine what are almost by definition exceptional cases -the emergence of new issues and/or significant changes in the composition of interest communities. It is less clear whether the population dynamics of most interest organization guilds and the kinds of lobbying activity that comprise politics as usual typically follow this pattern. This is especially so because recent research shows that there are marked differences between cases where organized interests lobby to change policy and where they seek to maintain the status quo policy (Baumgartner et al. 2009 ).
Our third hypothesis suggests that change in the composition of interest communities lags legislative agendas. While not a common view within political science or in European analyses of organized interests, this hypothesis lies at the heart of one of the major competitors to the Stigler-Peltzman-Olson model within economics (Mitchell and Munger 1991) . The lagging model switches the direction of corruption, with politicians extorting campaign funds from economic sectors by introducing bills that compel them to organize for political activity so as to pay protection money (Mueller and Murrell 1990; Coughlin, Mueller, and Murrell 1990; Shugart and Tollison 1986) . That is, politicians introduce bills to expropriate rents or to encourage bureaucratic agencies to propose new regulations that have the same effect. The resulting rush to the capitol constitutes an auction that "provides valuable information whether regulator action or inaction will be more lucrative to politicians themselves; it helps to identify the likely payers and to set the amounts of compensation to be paid" (McChesney 1997, 36) . Over time, politicians learn who the most lucrative extortion targets are and maintain a steady stream of proposed legislation to ensure that funds continue to flow. In this model, agendas arise neither from the demands of interest organizations nor disturbances in society. Rather, they arise from the need of legislators to raise campaign cash or some equivalent resource that they value. Thus, legislative agendas are constructed prior to lobbying activity, with the latter responding to the former.
Though from a fundamentally different point of view, neocorporatist and institutionoriented scholars would expect a similar time-order. In such a view, interest organizations enter into a relatively long-lasting exchange relationship with policy makers. Indeed, over time, organized interests may develop very close ties with state actors. In the words of Streeck and Kenworthy (2005, 452) , the former "may turn into extended arms of government." Such ties are especially likely to develop when governments provide subsidies or give interest organizations a formal role in policy implementation. Although such ties may become so close as to render the occurrence of legislation and lobbying so proximate as to be contemporaneous, we think in more likely in such cases that organized interests typically react to, and thus lag, legislative activity. In the EU case, it has been argued that political actors create -through, among other incentives, subsidies -the very interest community that is affected by the legislation (Greenwood, 2007; Sanchez-Salgado, 2007) . Before legislation on subsidies is adopted, there is simply no organized interest present to lobby.
Although there have been a few indirect tests cited in support of its core propositions (Beck, Hoskin, and Connelly 1992; McChesney 1997, 83-85) , the underlying assumptions of the lag model have rarely been examined empirically. In one exception, Lowery, Gray, and Fellowes (2005) found that the size and breadth of U.S. state legislative agendas are only weakly or even inversely related to a number of variables that would seem to address directly the incentives of legislators to raise campaign cash -the costs of state legislative electoral campaigns, the extent to which they are publicly financed, and the presence of contribution limits. More broadly, it seems unlikely that the hard extortion version of this view can provide a general explanation of the structure of interest communities. Even in the United States, most organized interests do not contribute campaign funds, the purported reason for their existence from the legislator's perspective. And when we turn to European cases, this currency of extortion is missing entirely, and there is no obvious alternative currency that might provide the kind of powerful incentive to fuel this kind of coercive relationship. Nor do most interest organizations in Europe receive some form of subsidy.
Still, there are other reasons to expect that the relationship between lobbying and legislative activity might be a lagging one. That is, the pluralist model suggests that organized interests respond to disturbances (Truman 1951) . But not all disturbances are limited to exogenous events occurring in society. Rather, government activity itself constitutes a powerful disturbance to which organized interests might well respond. And 6 indeed, studies of this "demand" function of lobbying in the U.S. and the European Union have often found that greater government attention to policy issues powerfully draws organized interests into lobbying activity (Leech, Baumgartner, La Pira, and Semanko. 2005; Gray, Lowery, Fellowes, and Anderson 2005; Messer, Berkhout, and Lowery 2011) .
However, such findings are largely based on very lumpy temporal observations and/or cross-sectional observations across the American states or the European Union. A more precise level of measurement is needed. But more precise observations might be especially expected to uncover such a lagging demand response in the case of the European Union. That is, given the very powerful policy role of the European Commission, we might well expect organized interests to rush to the European Parliament as an appeals court, thereby seeking redress to the policy disturbances inherent in Commission policy proposals.
Finally, we must consider a number of practical limitations that together comprise something of a second null hypothesis -in this case, an observational null hypothesis. That is, the activities around which organized interests mobilize are not all of a single kind. These differences might make it difficult to observe a simple pattern of contemporaneous, lagging, or leading relationship.
First, not all issues attract the same level of activity on the part of organized interests.
Some issues attract the attention of only one or a few organized interests, others pit small groups of interests against each other (e.g., air and rail transport), and still others generate titanic battles between armies of lobbyists representing, for example, consumer and producer interests (Smith 2000) . A leading function might be far more plausible for the first, where a specific interest is seeking a change in policy, and less so for the last, where organized interests are drawn to the sound of an on-going battle.
Second, different kinds of interests might respond to a given policy proposal at different times. Thus, one set of interests (e.g., rail transport interests) might promote policy changes advantageous to them, thereby leading policy activity. Their success might well generate a lagging response by other interests (e.g., air transport interests) if the very success of the first set of interests constitutes a disturbance to the second's vital interests. While evidence of such counter-mobilization is limited (Gray, Lowery, Wolak, Godwin, and Kilburn 2005) , it remains an attractive hypothesis in the literature. In either case, we might see lagging, leading, and perhaps even contemporaneous responses simultaneously.
A final complication in this regard concerns the kinds of interest organizations that are either responding to or generating policy activity. That is, while all of the models we have examined here tend to treat all organized interests as if they were the same, there are marked differences in their levels of policy involvement. While observations of populations of interests in the U.S. and the European Union have found them to be highly volatile with considerable churning within interest communities, a few interests are nearly permanent members and most but temporary residents there for a short time (Anderson, Newmark, Gray, and Lowery 2004; Berkhout and Lowery 2011) . The former, the old bulls among lobbying organizations, are often advocacy groups whose main purpose is lobbying to promote or impede lobbying change. The latter -the mayflies of the lobbying community -are often interests whose main functions are not advocacy per se (e.g., producing tires). They appear only as policy impinges on their primary interests (Gray and Lowery 1995) . It would seem likely that the old bulls might well be more likely to engage in leading policy change while the latter are more responsive, and thus lag, proposals for policy change.
Lobbying in and legislative production in the European Union
Although the arguments put forward by these competing perspectives are of a general nature, an empirical study that tests them must consider the institutional context that structures both legislative production and influences interest group mobilization in its empirical domain.
Within any political system interest groups have several institutional venues in which to seek influence. The attractiveness of any one institution for lobbyists depends in part on the role the institution plays in the policy process. This is especially true for the complex structure of the EU. While the US Congress has the power to both initiate legislative proposals and decide upon them, the role of the European Parliament is more limited. Within the EU, the unelected Commission has a monopoly on legislative initiative. Because all legislative proposals originate here, the Commission receives significant attention by interest groups and by scholars studying interest representation in the EU (Coen 2007) . Nevertheless, lobbying does not cease once proposals take shape as groups further seek influence over amendments and the final adoption of legislation (Marshall 2010) .
Like in the US Congress, legislative decision-making is shared between two institutions. The precise relationship between the EP and the Council on this matter depends on the applicable treaty provisions, which determine the decision making procedure to be used. Formerly, the decision making role of the EP was more limited, however successive reforms have seen an increase in the policy areas in which the Council and the EP act together as coequal legislators in the context of the so-called "co-decision" procedure (renamed the 'ordinary legislative procedure' by the Treaty of Lisbon). Additionally, the EP has a privileged role in EU budgetary policy. Not only does it monitor spending, it also acts together with the Council in adopting the budget and can unilaterally approve the budget if no agreement with the Council is made. As a result, groups that depend in part on EU funding have a strong incentive to closely monitor the EP's budgetary activities. On the other hand, in fields like the Common Foreign and Security Policy, taxation, and other more narrowly defined areas the EP has a more advisory or consultative function, and decisions are made by the Council. In such areas interest groups have little incentive to lobby Parliament.
The type of legislative act being debated may also influence the attractiveness to interest groups seeking influence. The two most important legislative instruments in the EU are regulations and directives. While regulations have direct legal effect, directives must first be transposed individually by each member state. Because some directives grant the member states significant flexibility in how they adapt EU requirements, interest groups may have yet another venue in which to shape policy.
Last, it is likely that the interest group community lobbying the European Parliament is more volatile than communities lobbying national parliaments are. A large proportion of interest organizations from member states have their permanent base and headquarters in member state capitals, and are 'tourists' when lobbying the European Parliament . This makes the European Parliament a very likely case to observe a very close relationship between legislative activity and the presence of lobbyists.
Testing the Competing Expectations
Data
In order to test the arguments outlined above, we combine two unique sources of information directly relevant to the puzzle we have identified -data on the interest group registration at the European Parliament (EP) and data on the legislative activity of the EU derived from EURLEX. In the following section, we briefly describe these two data sources.
The European Parliament maintains a door pass system for lobbyists. Everyone entering the Parliament's premises as a lobbyist is required to register on this list (EP, 2003-ongoing) . If not renewed, the accreditation expires after one year. This registration list is available online and reports personal names and organizational affiliation. The door pass requirement has been part of the Rules and Procedures of the European Parliament since 1996. For a more elaborate discussion of the register in relation to other registers and its history, see Chabanet (2006: 10, 21 ), Balme and Chabanet (2009: 208-234) , and Lowery (2008, 2011) .
The door pass data have a number of major advantages for our purpose in comparison to other directories (CONECCS, Public Affairs Directory, new Transparancy register). First, the door passes are important, indeed necessary, to lobbyists in conducting their influence activities. The data tell us something about actual activity instead of mere organizational existence. Second, the list is administered by the Parliament instead of self-administered by the registrants as is the case for the EC register. This means that there is a certain threshold that must be passed for registration -one cannot register online and a registrant needs to provide personal and organizational information in person. At the same time, the door pass system poses a low entry barrier as, contrary to for instance the old CONECCS register, various types of organizations may apply for accreditation. Last, the register is relatively sensitive to changes over time. The online version of the register does not provide the dates of registration of entry passes. However, we have obtained an electronic copy of all registrations in the system until April 2011 directly by the EP secretariat. This version of the register provides the start and end date of the passes for every organization. The same organization can feature more than once.
A random sample of 1300 organizations was drawn from copies of online available versions of the register (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) . The sampling was done after the merger of the organizations into a single list. This means that organizations that are present throughout the time period studied have the same chance to be in the sample as those that were present for only a very short period of time. On the aggregate, however, this produces a sample that is not representative of the lobby activity over the full time period because organizations that have been present for four years are likely to have developed more activities than organizations that were present for only a couple of months. However, we are interested in changes in the interest community in terms of or in association with the policies lobbied.
Still, if anything, this bias towards 'tourists' in the system (and an overestimation of system volatility) should make it more likely to find a relationship between interest community changes and legislative activity. Remember that the online version of the list does not provide the exact date of registration. Therefore we match the organizations sampled with the registration dates provided by the EP secretariat. About half of the organization could be matched. This reduces our sample to 670 organizations but does not further bias the selection of organizations. The time period over which the data on interest group is considered reliable is thus 2005-2011. Four student coders visited the websites for each organization from the sample and recorded the kind of interest each group represents (business, public, societal, or cross-sectoral) as well as the specific policy areas that each group/organization lists as its policy priorities (see below for a description of the categories used). Intercoder reliability for the placing of groups into policy areas was moderate (0.60 for Cronbach's Alpha).
The precise operationalization of interest group mobilization that we use is the number of new passes issued to organizations registered at the EP which are active in a specific policy area for each quarter between 2005.I and 2011.I. We track the number of new registrations rather than then net number of organizations (passes) being registered during the period because the end date of the registrations is rather arbitrary (one year for the vast majority of cases) and the de-registration dates are not as reliable as the registration dates.
The data used to track the legislative output of the EU is derived from the EURLEX (former CELEX) database available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu. For the period that we study, EURLEX has comprehensive information on all adopted legislation and on all Commission proposals for legislative acts. First, we extracted the information on all proposals for legal acts (directives, regulations, and decisions) for the period 2005-2011. Relying on the search functions of EURLEX does not produce precise information (for example, one gets numerous corrigenda of legal acts listed separately in the list of results). In response to this potential problem, we used automated data extraction to obtain data at the lowest possible level of aggregation (proposal) and performed all further manipulations and categorizations using this legal act-level data.
In order to categorize the EU legislative output, we use the classification headings provided by EURLEX in order to derive two lists of policy domains -a general and a specific one. The EURLEX classification headings provide a hierarchically-structured scheme. That is, each legal act was put into several (up the three) categories. The main list consists of 20 categories, and under each of the general categories there are additional subheadings. The general list of policy domains that we construct follows closely the EURLEX classification, but we exclude several EURLEX categories that are not associated with legislative acts (e.g. category 20 -People's Europe). For example, the general list includes Agriculture, Social Policy, Transport, etc. The specific list of policy domains we construct takes advantage of the EURLEX sub-categories at the lowest level of aggregation and covers 65 policy domains. In this list, the policy domains are narrowly defined, for example Agriculture: Milk, Energy:
Coal, and Land Transport. Appendix I provide details on how we map our policy domains to the existing categories of the EURLEX classification system. In order to explore the theoretical possibility that the type of policy field matters for the relationship between mobilization and legislative activity, we categorize the general 11 policy areas into three groups: the first group comprises of policy fields that attract broad social interest -these are Environment and Consumer Protection, Social Policy and Education, Science and Culture; the second group collects the policy fields which are likely to be dominated by a smaller number of more narrowly defined interests -these are Internal Market, Transport, Energy, Economic law, Agriculture, Fisheries, Taxation; the third and final group comprises of the policy fields which are active in External affairs, Common Foreign and Security Policy, Justice and Regional policy.
In principle, both the interest group and the legislative proposals datasets allow for aggregating the data in time periods of arbitrarily small durations (e.g. days). We chose to use quarters as the unit of observation for the main analyses presented in the article because it is short enough to capture variation in the population of interest groups and legislative proposals, and at the same time is long enough to filter random fluctuations in the number of 
Method of analysis
We start by examining the relationships between interest organizations and legislative proposals using a series of OSL regression with lagged independent and dependent variables.
For each policy area, we estimate the equations:
(1) Proposals t = Proposals t-1 + InterestGroups t-1 + error, (2) InterestGroups t = Proposals t-1 + InterestGroups t-1 + error, Essentially, our approach is the same as Granger causality test with one lag. We test whether the lagged values of the exogenous variable are associated with the contemporary values of the dependent variable, net of the effect of the lagged values of the dependent variable. The time series of the number of registered interest groups in each policy area show evidence for auto-correlation which, however, disappear once lagged values are included. We examined the cross-correlations for evidence of possible associations at lags greater than one, but we did not find any systematic evidence for such dependencies in the data. Since including additional lags would further decrease the effective number of observations we settled for including a single lag. First, we run and report the results from separate regressions for each policy area.
Then we present a multi-level model in order to allow the policy areas to be treated as random rather than fixed effects, and to be able to test the hypotheses about the effect of the type of policy field on the relationship between interest group mobilization and legislative activity.
Findings
We run two sets of analyses: one using the general list of policy sectors and a second one using the detailed list of 65 narrowly-defined subfields. For both sets of analyses we show dotplots of the estimated regression coefficients and confidence intervals for each policy area.
The coefficient for the exogenous variable is estimated to be significantly different from zero (at the 0.05 level) when the confidence intervals do not overlap with the vertical line at zero.
The dotplots provide a better view of the distribution of the policy-level coefficients than a table.
[ Figure 1 here] Focusing first on the general categories, Figure 1 Furthermore, several negative coefficients are estimated, while it is hard to imagine any reasons why more legislative proposals introduced should lower the number of active interest groups in the policy field. Overall, there is no evidence that changes in the interest group population follow changing levels of legislative activity in the EU.
[ Figure 2 here] Next, using the same list of general policy categories, let us examine the hypothesis that interest groups lead in the relationship. Figure 2 show the results of the estimated 13 regressions. Again, there is no clear pattern. Only one policy area (CFSP -Common Foreign and Security Policy) appears to be statistically significant in the expected direction but given the overall distribution of results, we should not put any confidence in this association.
Overall, there is no evidence that lagged values of the number of registered interest groups are helpful in predicting the current values of proposed legislation. We have to conclude that in the EU context, the dynamics of interest group mobilization and legislative production appear unrelated.
But so far we have relied on a rather general list of policy categories which might obscure any relationship at a lower level of aggregation. Theoretically, it is more likely that a link would appear when we examine more narrowly-defined domains. Interest groups representing the cosmetics industry might not be interested in industrial policy in general, but should certainly care about forthcoming legislation affecting the cosmetics sector in particular.
[ Figure 3 here] The second set of analyses we preset are based on the list of 65 specific policy areas.
Again, we first look whether legislative activity leads changes in the size of the registered interest group population. [ Figure 4 here] Finally, we need to re-examine the hypotheses that interest groups lead in the relationship implying that increase in the size of the registered population of interest groups precede the adoption of new legislative proposals. Figure 4 shows the results of the 65 regressions. The plot shows that there is no evidence for a link between the past number of registered interest groups and the changes in the legislative proposals made for any of the policy areas included (the one 'significant' coefficient is in fact negative). Overall, neither the specific policies nor the general ones show any evidence that the temporal movements of 14 legislative activity and interest group mobilization are related in the case of the EU. The fluctuations in the size of the interest group population neither lead nor lag bursts in legislative activity.
The policy level regressions presented above suffer from two shortcomings: first, they do not allow for a test of the hypothesis that different types of policy areas engender different types of dynamics between interest group mobilization and legislative activity, and, second, by estimating the effects of the exogenous variables separately no potentially useful information from other policy areas is taken into account. To address these two concerns, we present the results of two multilevel models which model the policy area as a random effect and include the type of policy area as a second-order predictor. Interactions between the lagged exogenous variables and the policy type provide a clue whether the relationships between interest groups and legislative activity differs in the different subgroups of policy areas.
[ Table 1 here] Table 1 presents the results of the multilevel model of interest group mobilization.
Focusing first on the main fixed effects, we note that the autocorrelation between lagged and present values of the number of newly registered interest groups is large and significant, but there is no significant association between past values of legislation and the current values of interest groups (the estimated effect is positive but with a large standard deviation). The type of policy field also does not have a significant effect with social/environmental/consumer protection groups attracting in general more interest groups and foreign affairs/justice/ regional policy slightly less than the baseline group of business-related policy areas. The interactions between type of policy area and lagged mobilization and legislation are also not significant. This implies that the relationship between interest groups and legislation (or rather, the lack thereof) does not change significantly between types of policy areas. Turning to the random effects, the varying intercepts for policy field account for a large part of the variation with a standard deviation of 12.65 (vs. the residual 8.04). On the other hand, allowing the slopes for lagged interest groups and legislation to vary with policy field as well, accounts for minor parts of the variation only and does not improve the fit of the model. These results are robust to different units of observation (semesters, years) and to restricting the sample to directives, and to co-decision only (see Table A .2 in Appendix II).
[ Table 2 here] Table 2 presents the results of the multilevel model of legislative activity. Contrary to theoretical expectations and intuition, the estimated effect of the lagged number of interest groups is estimated as negative, although it is not significant. There is also no significant autocorrelation of legislative activity. There are no significant interactions between the policy types and lagged legislative activity and interest group mobilization (when interest group mobilization is coupled with the foreign affairs/justice/regional policy type, the interaction is positive and significant but the effect is minor and not robust -see Table A .3 in Appendix II).
Turning to the random effects, the varying intercepts for policy field account for a large part of the variation implying that the number of new legislation differs a lot per policy field (which is not really surprising). The varying slopes for lagged legislative activity and interest group mobilization do not improve much for model fit meaning that the effects of these variables does not differ a lot by policy field.
In order to check the robustness of this conclusion we replicated the analyses using only legislation adopted under co-decision (so with the active involvement of the EP) and only directives (or 'ordinary legislative acts' which usually give legal form to the most important policy initiative of the EU) instead of all legislation. None of these additional analyses provide any traces for a temporal relationship between interest groups and legislative activity. The tables summarizing the results are included in Appendix II. No major changes in the general pattern of null results were observed. Finally, we aggregated the data first at semester and then at yearly time windows (instead of quarters), but we could not find any significant association (see Appendix II). Furthermore, we replicated the analyses using the number of adopted legislation rather than the number of legislative proposals as a measure of legislative activity but no systematic link appeared (although we experimented with a higher number of lags). We also replaced the total number of interest organizations with the number of business organizations and advocacy organizations, respectively.
Conclusion
Such largely null results must be considered from a number of perspectives. First, from an empirical standpoint, the analyses can be improved in several ways. First, a longer time series (as it becomes available) might enable us to better account in terms of statistical power for the dynamics in the relationships between legislation and interest organization mobilization. It could be argued that the two-year period observed here might be too short to observe the interplay between these two series across a full policy cycle, from the earliest informal proposal stage to the final adoption. Moreover, the availability of more data points would enable us to include more lags in the models without compromising their reliability. At the same time, by considering proposals and adopted legislation separately, we have alleviated the disadvantages of the short time-series to some extent.
Second, the categorization of legislation based on EURLEX codes may exclude key legislation directly affecting interests in a given policy area, while including legislation that is of peripheral importance to those interest organizations. Interest organizations lobby specific pieces of legislation, not policy areas as a whole. Thus, while we would not argue that our analysis necessarily offers the final word on these relationships, current data collection opportunities do not offer much leeway to improve on the matching an interest group's domain of interest and the associated legislative output.
Still, we are not persuaded that our null and mixed findings can be fully explained by these data imitations. In regard to the first set of issues, especially, the data were very well suited to the theoretical question at hand. Indeed, the key problem with the few prior studies of the temporal relationship between legislative and lobbying activity has been the lack of shorter-term observations of their co-variation, not a lack of data on longer-term co-variation.
And the length of the time series in terms of lags and leads encompasses well the time period in which most legislation is considered. And even greater specificity of linking lobbying and legislation would seem unlikely to dramatically alter our findings given the essentially null results for both our specific and general policy results.
Instead, we think that we need to give greater attention to the observational null hypothesis introduced earlier in our discussion of the competing theoretical expectations about the temporal relationship between legislation and lobbying. The several theoretical perspectives we noted -highlight lagging, leading, and contemporaneous effects -are essentially caricatures that are typically drawn from studies of specific, often extremely controversial or prominent (changes in) legislation or specific interest organizations that are, again, often atypical in the sense of a prior reputation for influence that may largely be related to maintaining status-quo policies and legislation. More often than not, scholars extract lessons from these atypical cases that they then apply to interest organizations as a whole, suggesting that all interest organizations operate in an environment in which, alternatively, they or government policymakers dominate the process. The truth is likely to be much more complex. Interest organizations sometimes lag, sometimes lead, and sometimes contemporaneously engage the public policy process. Given this mix of modes of engagement, null results would be expected and none of the caricatures would be expected to provide a sufficient account of the complexities of the policy process insofar as it involves the activities of wide range of quite different kinds of interest organizations, a wide range of different kinds of policy proposals, and a wide range of governmental actors.
So, while more complete data and more thorough data analysis might well be called for, it may be even more important that we step back to address the rather thin -and at the same time overly broad -theoretical expectations provided by the caricatures now available in the literature on interest representation. That is, we need to step back and consider in a much more precise manner when, how, and especially why organized interests become engaged in the policy process. This will necessarily entail considering how interest organizations differ among themselves, when and how they react to each other, and when and how different kinds of policy legislation engage the activities interest organizations. Given the null results presented here, such more complex theoretical expectations are needed to drive further empirical analysis beyond merely looking for more detailed and dynamic central tendencies in the timing of legislative and lobbying activity. Does time matter? Almost certainly. But it is likely to matter in several different ways for different policies and different interest organizations. At a minimum, our null results suggest that a single, simple pattern of temporal relationship is unlikely to be sufficient or satisfying.
One of the main conceptual challenges facing the research field, and that is not fully resolved in this article, is that interest organizations tend to organize for a variety of reasons, where lobbying may be only a by-product of other activities. The classifications of interest organizations on the basis of the organizational rationale or social basis such as economic sectors consequently match classifications of policy domains such as EURLEX or policy agenda codes only partially (and vice versa). Depending on the type of data source used this may produce imprecise measurements of interest group activity. This is the main reason why researchers are well advised to draw a strong distinction between questions regarding on the one hand policy activities and on the other hand organizational maintenance or population issues. Though we try to link some aspects of those two types of questions, in this article we have predominantly addressed policy or legislation related questions. By our focus on the policy priorities of organizations, there is only limited contamination of coding the broader socio-economic interests instead of the relatively immediate and more narrow legislative interests. The precision of our data is further enhanced by using policy-related data sources instead of more general registers of interest organizations.
US lobby registration data is not available on anything less than an semi-annual basis. Therefore, it is not possible to get the kind of short-term activity of interest organizations immediately prior to and following the consideration of legislation. In contrast, the EP doorpass data provide a level of detail on lobbying activity that is unmatched in the US data, although the US data provide far more detail on actual lobbying effort.
Another avenue for further research might be to use surveys rather than website-based classification of interest organizations? The major disadvantage of surveys is the nonresponse bias. On the other hand, websites have the additional advantage that they show actual behavior instead of stated behavior. However, surveys may provide more precise information on specific legislative activity. In surveys interest organizations may provide 'more honest' information instead of a 'preferred public profile' presented online (though social/political desirability is also a problem for surveys). In a future project, a combination of both methods could be pursued. 
Random effects
